Posts Tagged ‘design’

Towards Building More Secure Networks

Tuesday, May 15th, 2012

It is no surprise that security is at the forefront of everyone’s minds these days. With high profile breaches, to script kiddies wreaking havoc across the Internet, it is obvious that there are some weaknesses that need to be addressed.

In most cases, complete network redesigns are out of the question. This can be extremely invasive and costly. However, it may be possible to augment the existing network in such a manner as to add additional layers of security. It’s also possible that this may lead to the possibility of being able to make even more changes down the road.

So what do I mean by this? Allow me to explain…

Many networks are fairly simple with only a few subnets, typically a user and a server subnet. Sometimes there’s a bit of complexity on the user side, creating subnets per department, or subnets per building. Often this has more to do with manageability of users rather than security. Regardless, it’s a good practice that can be used to make a network more secure in the long run.

What is often neglected is the server side of things. Typically, there are one, maybe two subnets. Outside users are granted access to the standard web ports. Sometimes more ports such as ssh and ftp are opened for a variety of reasons. What administrators don’t realize, or don’t intend is that they’re allowing outsiders direct access to their core servers, without any sort of security in front of it. Sure, sure, there might be a firewall, but a firewall is there to ensure you only come in on the proper ports, right? If your traffic is destined for port 80, it doesn’t matter if it’s malicious or not, the firewall lets it through anyway.

But what’s the alternative? What can be done instead? Well, what about sending outside traffic to a separate network where the systems being accessed are less critical, and designed to verify traffic before passing it on to your core servers? What I’m talking about is creating a DMZ network and forcing all users through a proxy. Even a simple proxy can help to prevent many attacks by merely dropping illegal traffic and not letting it through to the core server. Proxies can also be heavily fortified with HIDS and other security software designed to look for suspicious traffic and block it.

By adding in this DMZ layer, you’ve put a barrier between your server core and the outside world. This is known as layered defense. You can add additional layers as time and resources allow. For instance, I recommend segmenting away database servers as well as identity management servers. Adding this additional segmentation can be done over time as new servers come online and old servers are retired. The end goal is to add this additional security without disrupting the network as a whole.

If you have the luxury of building a new network from the ground up, however, make sure you build this in from the start. There is, of course, a breaking point. It makes sense to create networks to segregate servers by security level, but it doesn’t make sense to segregate purely to segregate. For instance, you may segregate database and identity management servers away from the rest of the servers, but segregating Oracle servers away from MySQL servers may not add much additional security. There are exceptions, but I suggest you think long and hard before you make such an exception. Are you sure that the additional management overhead is worth the security? There’s always a cost/benefit analysis to perform.

Segregating networks is just the beginning. The purpose here is to enhance security. By segregating networks, you can significantly reduce the number of clients that need to access a particular server. The whole world may need to access your proxy servers, but only your proxy servers need to access the actual web application servers. Likewise, only your web application servers need access to your database servers. Using this information, you can tighten down your firewall. But remember, a firewall is just a wall with holes in it. The purpose is to deflect random attacks, but it does little to nothing to prevent attacks on ports you’ve opened. For that, there are other tools.

At the very edge, simplistic fire walling and generally loose HIDS can be used to deflect most attacks. As you move further within the network, additional security can be used. For instance, deploying an IPS at the very edge of the network can result in the IPS being quickly overwhelmed. Of course, you can buy a bigger, better IPS, but to what end? Instead, you can move the IPS further into the network, placing it where it be more effective. If you place it between the proxy and the web server, you’ve already ensured that the only traffic hitting the IPS is loosely validated HTTP traffic. With this knowledge, you can reduce the number of signatures the IPS needs to have, concentrating on high quality HTTP signatures. Likewise, an IPS between the web servers and database servers can be configured with high quality database signatures. You can, in general, direct the IPS to block any and all traffic that falls outside of those parameters.

As the adage goes, there is no silver bullet for security. Instead, you need to use every weapon in your arsenal and put together a solid defense. By combining all of these techniques together, you can defend against many attacks. But remember, there’s always a way in. You will not be able to stop the most determined attacker, you can only hope to slow him down enough to limit his access. And remember, securing your network is only one aspect of security. Don’t forget about the other low hanging fruit such as SQL injection, cross site scripting, and other common application holes. You may have the most secure network in existence, but a simple SQL injection attack can result in a massive data breach.