Posts Tagged ‘certificates’

Becoming your own CA

Thursday, February 13th, 2014

SSL, as I mentioned in a previous blog entry, has some issues when it comes to trust. But regardless of the problems with SSL, it is a necessary part of the security toolchain. In certain situations, however, it is possible to overcome these trust issues.

Commercial providers are not the only entities that are capable of being a Certificate Authority. In fact, anyone can become a CA and the tools to do so are available for free. Becoming your own CA is a fairly painless process, though you might want to brush up on your openSSL skills. And lest you think you can just start signing certificates and selling them to third parties, it’s not quite that simple. The well-known certificate authorities have worked with browser vendors to have their root certificates added as part of the browser installation process. You’ll have to convince the browser vendors that they need to add your root certificate as well. Good luck.

Having your own CA provides you the means to import your own root certificate into your browser and use it to validate certificates you use within your network. You can use these SSL certificates for more than just websites as well. LDAP, RADIUS, SMTP, and other common applications use standard SSL certificates for encrypting traffic and validating remote connections. But as mentioned above, be aware that unless a remote user has a copy of your root certificate, they will be unable to validate the authenticity of your signed certificates.

Using certificates signed by your own CA can provide you that extra trust level you may be seeking. Perhaps you configured your mail server to use your certificate for the POP and IMAP protocols. This makes it more difficult for an attacker to masquerade as either of those services without obtaining your signing certificate so they can create their own. This is especially true if you configure your mail client such that your root certificate is the only certificate that can be used for validation.

Using your own signed certificates for internal, non-public facing services provides an even better use-case. Attacks such as DNS cache poisoning make it possible for attackers to trick devices into using the wrong address for an intended destination. If these services are configured to only use your certificates and reject connection attempts from peers with invalid certificates, then attackers will only be able to impersonate the destination if they can somehow obtain a valid certificate signed by your signing certificate.

Sound good? Well, how do we go about creating our own root certificate and all the various machinery necessary to make this work? Fortunately, all of the necessary tools are open-source and part of most Linux distributions. For the purposes of this blog post, I will be explaining how this is accomplished using the CentOS 6.x Linux distribution. I will also endeavor to break down each command and explain what each parameter does. Much of this information can be found in the man pages for the various commands.

OpenSSL is installed as part of a base CentOS install. Included in the install is a directory structure in /etc/pki. All of the necessary tools and configuration files are located in this directory structure, so instead of reinventing the wheel, we’ll use the existing setup.

To get started, edit the default openssl.cnf configuration file. You can find this file in /etc/pki/tls. There are a few options you want to change from their defaults. Search for the following headers and change the options listed within.

[CA_default]
default_md = sha256

[req]
default_bits = 4096
default_md = sha256
  • default_md : This option defined the default message digest to use. Switching this to sha256 result in a stronger message digest being used.
  • default_bits : This option defines the default key size. 2048 is generally considered a minimum these days. I recommend setting this to 4096.

Once the openssl.cnf file is set up, the rest of the process is painless. First, switch into the correct directory.

cd /etc/pki/tls/misc

Next, use the CA command to create a new CA.

[root@localhost misc]# ./CA -newca
CA certificate filename (or enter to create)

Making CA certificate ...
Generating a 4096 bit RSA private key
 ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................++
.......................................................................++
writing new private key to '/etc/pki/CA/private/./cakey.pem'
Enter PEM pass phrase:
Verifying - Enter PEM pass phrase:
-----
You are about to be asked to enter information that will be incorporated
into your certificate request.
What you are about to enter is what is called a Distinguished Name or a DN.
There are quite a few fields but you can leave some blank
For some fields there will be a default value,
If you enter '.', the field will be left blank.
-----
Country Name (2 letter code) [XX]:US
State or Province Name (full name) []:MyState
Locality Name (eg, city) [Default City]:MyCity
Organization Name (eg, company) [Default Company Ltd]:My Company Inc.
Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) []:
Common Name (eg, your name or your server's hostname) []:cert.example.com
Email Address []:certadmin@example.com

Please enter the following 'extra' attributes
to be sent with your certificate request
A challenge password []:
An optional company name []:
Using configuration from /etc/pki/tls/openssl.cnf
Enter pass phrase for /etc/pki/CA/private/./cakey.pem:
Check that the request matches the signature
Signature ok
Certificate Details:
        Serial Number: 17886042129551798347 (0xf837fc8d719b304b)
        Validity
            Not Before: Feb 13 18:37:14 2014 GMT
            Not After : Feb 12 18:37:14 2017 GMT
        Subject:
            countryName               = US
            stateOrProvinceName       = MyState
            organizationName          = My Company Inc.
            commonName                = cert.example.com
            emailAddress              = certadmin@example.com
        X509v3 extensions:
            X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
                14:FC:14:BC:F4:A5:3E:6B:0C:58:3B:DF:3B:26:35:46:A0:BE:EC:F1
            X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
                keyid:14:FC:14:BC:F4:A5:3E:6B:0C:58:3B:DF:3B:26:35:46:A0:BE:EC:F1

            X509v3 Basic Constraints:
                CA:TRUE
Certificate is to be certified until Feb 12 18:37:14 2017 GMT (1095 days)

Write out database with 1 new entries
Data Base Updated

And that’s about it. The root certificate is located in /etc/pki/CA/cacert.pem. This file can be made public without compromising the security of your system. This is the same certificate you’ll want to import into your browser, email client, etc. in order to validate and certificates you may sign.

Now you can start signing certificates. First you’ll need to create a CSR on the server you want to install it on. The following command creates both the private key and the CSR for you. I recommend using the server name as the name of the CSR and the key.

openssl req -newkey rsa:4096 -keyout www.example.com.key -out www.example.com.csr
  • openssl : The openSSL command itself
  • req : This option tells openSSL that we are performing a certificate signing request (CSR) operation.
  • -newkey : This option creates a new certificate request and a new private key. It will prompt the user for the relevant field values. The rsa:4096 argument indicates that we want to use the RSA algorithm with a key size of 4096 bits.
  • -keyout : This gives the filename to write the newly created private key to.
  • -out : This specifies the output filename to write to.
[root@localhost misc]# openssl req -newkey rsa:4096 -keyout www.example.com.key -out www.example.com.csr Generating a 4096 bit RSA private key
.....................................................................................................................++
..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................++
writing new private key to 'www.example.com.key'
Enter PEM pass phrase:
Verifying - Enter PEM pass phrase:
-----
You are about to be asked to enter information that will be incorporated
into your certificate request.
What you are about to enter is what is called a Distinguished Name or a DN.
There are quite a few fields but you can leave some blank
For some fields there will be a default value,
If you enter '.', the field will be left blank.
-----
Country Name (2 letter code) [XX]:US
State or Province Name (full name) []:MyState
Locality Name (eg, city) [Default City]:MyCity
Organization Name (eg, company) [Default Company Ltd]:My Company Inc.
Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) []:
Common Name (eg, your name or your server's hostname) []:www.example.com
Email Address []:hostmaster@example.com

Once you have the CSR, copy it over to the server you’re using to sign certificates. Unfortunately, the existing tools don’t make it easy to merely name the CSR you’re trying to sign, so we need to create our own tool. First, create a new directory to put the CSRs in.

mkdir /etc/pki/tls/csr

Next, create the sign_cert.sh script in the directory we just created. This file needs to be executable.

#!/bin/sh

# Revoke last year's certificate first :
# openssl ca -revoke cert.crt

DOMAIN=$1
YEAR=`date +%Y`
rm -f newreq.pem
ln -s $DOMAIN.csr newreq.pem
/etc/pki/tls/misc/CA -sign
mv newcert.pem $DOMAIN.$YEAR.crt

That’s all you need to start signing certificates. Place the CSR you transferred from the other server into the csr directory and use script we just created to sign it.

[root@localhost csr]# ./sign_cert.sh www.example.com
Using configuration from /etc/pki/tls/openssl.cnf
Enter pass phrase for /etc/pki/CA/private/cakey.pem:
Check that the request matches the signature
Signature ok
Certificate Details:
        Serial Number: 17886042129551798348 (0xf837fc8d719b304c)
        Validity
            Not Before: Feb 13 18:48:55 2014 GMT
            Not After : Feb 13 18:48:55 2015 GMT
        Subject:
            countryName = US
            stateOrProvinceName = MyState
            localityName = MyCity
            organizationName = My Company Inc.
            commonName = www.example.com
            emailAddress = hostmaster@example.com
        X509v3 extensions:
            X509v3 Basic Constraints:
                CA:FALSE
            Netscape Comment:
                OpenSSL Generated Certificate
            X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
                3A:EE:2B:3A:73:A6:C3:5C:39:90:EA:85:3F:DA:71:33:7B:91:4D:7F
            X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
                keyid:14:FC:14:BC:F4:A5:3E:6B:0C:58:3B:DF:3B:26:35:46:A0:BE:EC:F1

Certificate is to be certified until Feb 13 18:48:55 2015 GMT (365 days)
Sign the certificate? [y/n]:y

1 out of 1 certificate requests certified, commit? [y/n]y
Write out database with 1 new entries
Data Base Updated
Certificate:
    Data:
        Version: 3 (0x2)
        Serial Number: 17886042129551798348 (0xf837fc8d719b304c)
    Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
        Issuer: C=US, ST=MyState, O=My Company Inc., CN=cert.example.com/emailAddress=certadmin@example.com
        Validity
            Not Before: Feb 13 18:48:55 2014 GMT
            Not After : Feb 13 18:48:55 2015 GMT
    Subject: C=US, ST=MyState, L=MyCity, O=My Company Inc., CN=www.example.com/emailAddress=hostmaster@example.com
    Subject Public Key Info:
        Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
            Public-Key: (4096 bit)
            Modulus:
                00:d9:5a:cc:87:f0:e5:1e:6f:a0:25:cd:fe:36:64:
                6c:68:ae:2f:3e:7e:93:93:a4:69:6f:f1:28:c1:c2:
                4d:5f:3c:3a:61:2e:4e:f0:90:89:54:48:d6:03:83:
                fb:ac:1e:7c:9a:e8:be:cf:c9:8f:93:41:27:3e:1b:
                66:63:db:a1:54:cb:f7:1d:0b:71:bc:5f:80:e1:30:
                e4:28:14:68:1c:09:ba:d0:aa:d3:e6:2b:24:cd:21:
                67:99:dc:8b:7a:2c:94:d0:ed:8e:02:5f:2f:52:06:
                09:0e:8a:b7:bf:64:e8:d7:bf:94:94:ad:80:34:57:
                32:89:51:00:fe:fd:8c:7d:17:35:4c:c7:5f:5b:58:
                f4:97:9b:21:42:9e:a9:6c:86:5f:f4:35:98:a5:81:
                62:9d:fa:15:07:9d:29:25:38:2b:5d:22:74:58:f8:
                58:56:1c:e9:65:a3:62:b5:a7:66:17:95:12:21:ca:
                82:12:90:b6:8a:8d:1f:79:e8:5c:f4:f9:6c:3a:44:
                f9:3a:3f:29:0d:2e:bf:51:98:9f:58:21:e5:d9:ee:
                78:54:ad:5a:a2:6f:d1:85:9a:bc:b9:21:92:e8:76:
                80:b8:0f:96:77:9a:99:5e:3b:06:bb:6f:da:1c:6e:
                f2:10:16:69:ba:2b:57:c8:1a:cc:b6:e4:0c:1d:b2:
                a6:b7:b9:6c:37:2e:80:13:46:a1:46:c3:ca:d6:2b:
                cd:f7:ba:38:98:74:15:7f:f1:67:03:8e:24:89:96:
                55:31:eb:d8:44:54:a5:11:04:59:e6:73:59:42:ed:
                aa:a3:37:13:ab:63:ab:ef:61:65:0a:af:2f:71:91:
                23:40:7d:f8:e8:a1:9d:cf:3f:e5:33:d9:5f:d2:4d:
                06:d0:2c:70:59:63:06:0f:2a:59:ae:ae:12:8d:f4:
                6c:fd:b2:33:76:e8:34:0f:1f:24:91:2a:a8:aa:1b:
                11:8a:0b:86:f3:67:b8:be:b7:a0:06:02:4a:76:ef:
                dd:ed:c4:a9:03:a1:8c:b0:39:9d:35:98:7f:04:1c:
                24:8a:1c:7c:6f:35:56:71:ee:b5:36:b7:3f:14:04:
                eb:48:a1:4f:6f:8e:43:7c:8b:36:4a:bf:ba:e9:8b:
                d9:38:0c:76:24:e9:a3:38:bf:4e:86:fd:31:4d:c3:
                6f:16:07:09:dd:d8:6b:0b:9d:4d:97:eb:1f:92:21:
                b2:a5:f9:d8:55:61:85:d2:99:97:bc:27:12:be:eb:
                55:86:ee:1f:f5:6f:a7:c5:64:2f:4e:c2:67:a3:52:
                97:7a:d9:66:89:05:6a:59:ed:69:7b:22:10:2b:a1:
                14:4e:5d:b8:f0:21:e9:11:d0:25:ae:bc:05:2b:c3:
                db:ad:cf
            Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
    X509v3 extensions:
        X509v3 Basic Constraints:
            CA:FALSE
        Netscape Comment:
            OpenSSL Generated Certificate
        X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
            3A:EE:2B:3A:73:A6:C3:5C:39:90:EA:85:3F:DA:71:33:7B:91:4D:7F
        X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
            keyid:14:FC:14:BC:F4:A5:3E:6B:0C:58:3B:DF:3B:26:35:46:A0:BE:EC:F1

Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
     ca:66:b2:55:64:e6:40:a5:85:19:11:66:0d:63:89:fb:0d:3a:
     0c:ec:fd:cb:5c:93:44:1e:3f:1b:ca:f5:3d:85:ab:0a:0b:dc:
     f3:18:1d:1f:ec:85:ff:f3:82:52:9e:c7:12:19:07:e9:6a:82:
     bd:32:f6:d1:19:b2:b7:09:1c:34:d7:89:45:7e:51:4d:42:d6:
     4e:78:b6:39:b3:76:58:f8:20:57:b3:d8:7b:e0:b3:2f:ce:9f:
     a2:59:de:f6:31:f2:09:1c:91:3b:7f:97:61:cb:11:a4:b4:73:
     ab:47:64:e8:93:07:98:d5:47:75:8d:9a:8f:a3:8f:e8:f4:42:
     7e:b8:1b:e8:36:72:13:93:f9:a8:cc:6d:b4:85:a7:af:94:fe:
     f3:6e:76:c2:4d:78:c3:c2:0b:a4:48:27:d3:eb:52:c3:46:14:
     c1:26:03:28:a0:53:c7:db:59:c9:95:b8:d9:f0:d9:a8:19:4a:
     a7:0f:81:ad:3c:e1:ec:f2:21:51:0d:bc:f9:f9:f6:b6:75:02:
     9f:43:de:e6:2f:9b:77:d3:c3:72:6f:f6:18:d7:a3:43:91:d2:
     04:2a:c8:bf:67:23:35:b7:41:3f:d1:63:fe:dc:53:a7:26:e9:
     f4:ee:3b:96:d5:2a:9c:6d:05:3d:27:6e:57:2f:c9:dc:12:06:
     2c:cf:0c:1b:09:62:5c:50:82:77:6b:5c:89:32:86:6b:26:30:
     d2:6e:33:20:fc:a6:be:5a:f0:16:1a:9d:b7:e0:d5:d7:bb:d8:
     35:57:d2:be:d5:07:98:b7:3c:18:38:f9:94:4c:26:3a:fe:f2:
     ad:40:e6:95:ef:4b:a9:df:b0:06:87:a2:6c:f2:6a:03:85:3b:
     97:a7:ef:e6:e5:d9:c3:57:87:09:06:ae:8a:5a:63:26:b9:35:
     29:a5:87:4b:7b:08:b9:63:1c:c3:65:7e:97:ae:79:79:ed:c3:
     a3:36:c3:87:1f:54:fe:0a:f1:1a:c1:71:3d:bc:9e:36:fc:da:
     03:2b:61:b5:19:0c:d7:4d:19:37:61:45:91:4c:c9:7a:5b:00:
     cd:c2:2d:36:f9:1f:c2:b1:97:2b:78:86:aa:75:0f:0a:7f:04:
     85:81:c5:8b:be:af:a6:a7:7a:d2:17:26:7a:86:0d:f8:fe:c0:
     27:a8:66:c7:92:cd:c5:34:99:c9:8e:c1:25:f3:98:df:4e:48:
     37:4a:ee:76:4a:fa:e4:66:b4:1f:cd:d8:e0:25:fd:c7:0b:b3:
     12:af:bb:b7:29:98:5e:86:f2:12:8e:20:c6:a9:40:6f:39:14:
     8b:71:9f:98:22:a0:5b:57:d1:f1:88:7d:86:ad:19:04:7b:7d:
     ee:f2:c9:87:f4:ca:06:07
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
Signed certificate is in newcert.pem

The script automatically renamed the newly signed certificate. In the above example, the signed certificate is in www.example.com.2014.crt. Transfer this file back to the server it belongs on and you’re all set to start using it.

That’s it! You’re now a certificate authority with the power to sign your own certificates. Don’t let all that power go to your head!

SSL “Security”

Friday, February 7th, 2014

SSL, a cryptographically secure protocol, was created by Netscape in the mid-1990’s. Today, SSL, and it’s replacement, TLS, are used by web browsers and other programs to create secure connections between devices across the Internet.

SSL provides the means to cryptographically secure a tunnel between endpoints, but there is another aspect of security that is missing. Trust. While a user may be confident that the data received from the other end of the SSL tunnel was sent by the remote system, the user can not be confident that the remote system is the system it claims to be. This problem was partially solved through the use of a Public Key Infrastructure, or PKI.

PKI, in a nutshell, provides the trust structure needed to make SSL secure. Certificates are issued by a certificate authority or CA. The CA cryptographically signs the certificate, enabling anyone to verify that the certificate was issued by the CA. Other PKI constructs offer validation of the registrant, indexing of the public keys, and a key revocation system. It is within these other constructs that the problems begin.

When SSL certificates were first offered for sale, the CAs spent a great deal of time and energy verifying the identity of the registrant. Often, paper copies of the proof had to be sent to the CA before a certificate would be issued. The process could take several days. More recently, the bar for entry has been lowered significantly. Certificates are now issued on an automated process requiring only that the registrant click on a link sent to one of the email addresses listed in the Whois information. This lack of thorough verification has significantly eroded the trust a user can place in the authenticity of a certificate.

CAs have responded to this problem by offering different levels of SSL certificates. Entry level certificates are verified automatically via the click of a link. Higher level SSL certificates have additional identity verification steps. And at the highest level, the Extended Validation, or EV certificate requires a thorough verification of the registrants identity. Often, these different levels of SSL certificates are marketed as stronger levels of encryption. The reality, however, is that the level of encryption for each of these certificates is exactly the same. The only difference is the amount of verification performed by the CA.

Despite the extra level of verification, these certificates are almost indistinguishable from one another. With the exception of EV certificates, the only noticeable difference between differing levels of SSL certificates are the identity details obtained before the certificate is issued. An EV certificate, on the other hand, can only be obtained from certain vendors, and shows up in a web browser with a special green overlay. The intent here seems to be that websites with EV certificates can be trusted more because the identity of the organization running the website was more thoroughly validated.

In the end, though, trust is the ultimate issue. Users have been trained to just trust a website with an SSL certificate. And trust sites with EV certificates even more. In fact, there have been a number of marketing campaigns targeted at convincing users that the “Green Address Bar” means that the website is completely trustworthy. And they’ve been pretty effective. But, as with most marketing, they didn’t quite tell the truth. sure, the EV certificate may mean that the site is more trustworthy, but it’s still possible that the certificate is fake.

There have been a number of well known CAs that have been compromised in recent years. Diginotar and Comodo being two of the more high profile ones. In both cases, it became possible for rogue certificates to be created for any website the attacker wanted to hijack. That certificate plus some creative DNS poisoning and the attacker suddenly looks like your bank, or google, or whatever site the attacker wants to be. And, they’ll have a nice shiny green EV certificate.

So how do we fix this? Well, one way would be to use the certificate revocation system that already exists within the PKI infrastructure. If a certificate is stolen, or a false certificate is created, the CA has the ability to put the signature for that certificate into the revocation system. When a user tries to load a site with a bad certificate, a warning is displayed telling the user that the certificate is not to be trusted.

Checking revocation of a certificate takes time, and what happens if the revocation server is down? Should the browser let the user go to the site anyway? Or should it block by default? The more secure option is to block, of course, but most users won’t understand what’s going on. So most browser manufacturers have either disabled revocation checking completely, or they default to allowing a user to access the site when the revocation site is slow or unavailable.

Without the ability to verify if a certificate is valid or not, there can be no real trust in the security of the connection, and that’s a problem. Perhaps one way to fix this problem is to disconnect the revocation process from the process of loading the webpage. If the revocation check happened in parallel to the page loading, it shouldn’t interfere with the speed of the page load. Additional controls can be put into place to prevent any data from being sent to the remote site without a warning until the revocation check completes. In this manner, the revocation check can take a few seconds to complete without impeding the use of the site. And after the first page load, the revocation information is cached anyway, so subsequent page loads are unaffected.

Another option, floated by the browser builders themselves, is to have the browser vendors host the revocation information. This information is then passed on to the browsers when they’re loaded. This way the revocation process can be handled outside of the CAs, handling situations such as those caused by a CA being compromised. Another idea would be to use short term certificates that expire quickly, dropping the need for revocation checks entirely.

It’s unclear as to what direction the market will move with this issue. It has been over two years since the attacks on Diginotar and Comodo and the immediacy of this problem seems to have passed. At the moment, the only real fix for this is user education. But with the marketing departments for SSL vendors working to convince users of the security of SSL, this seems unlikely.